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the mental attitude necessary to the recognition of this tenet. There
have, however, been many expressions to the effect that the answer
lies in quick, decisive judicial action. The desirability of one ap-
proach over the other is a question susceptible of too many socio-
logical and political implications to be the subject of a legal treatise.
It is believed that the Supreme Court will in the future adhere to
its established policy and allow the states and the individual mem-
bers of both races to iron out their difficulties in the spirit of coop-
eration and realization of mutual benefit.
ROBERT E. LEAKE, JR.
CRIMINAL PROC EDURE-DISTINcT OFFENSES ENUMERATED IN THE
SAME LAW-WHEN AND How CHARGEABLE IN THE SAME COUNT-
Defendant was prosecuted and convicted of the crime of reckless
driving under an ordinance1 defining reckless driving as embracing,
inter alia, driving a vehicle "while under the influence of intoxica-
ting liquor or narcotic drugs." The affidavit charged that the
defendant "did operate said vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or drugs." Held, remanded to allow the affidavit
to be amended. The defendant is entitled to know whether the
charge is driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or under the influence of drugs or both. Where the offenses or
methods of committing the offense are charged disjunctively and
alternatively, the precise accusation against the defendant is left
uncertain. City of Shreveport v. Bryson, 33 So. (2d) 60 (La. 1947).
The right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation is one of the corner
stones of Anglo-American justice.2 Thus, in the instant case, it was
held that this right may be denied by the use of the word "or" inplace of the word "and."
Article 222 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure states
a long-recognized rule:
"Several distinct offenses, or the intent necessary to consti-
tute such offenses, disjunctively enumerated in the same law or
in the same section of a criminal statute, may be cumulated in
the same count, when it appears that they are connected with
1. Ordinance 207 of 1923 of the City of Shreveport, § 85.
2. This right is guaranteed both by the Constitution of the United States
(Amendment VI) and by the Constitution of Louisiana (La. Const. of 1921,
Art. 1, § 10).
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the same transaction and constitute but one act, but in that
event they must be charged conjunctively."
The first hurdle to clear is whether the terms enumerated dis-
junctively in a criminal statute are actually several distinct offenses
or methods or committing the offense, or whether they are only
synonymous words. Where the term following the disjunctive "or"
in the statute is synonymous, explanatory, or merely provides an
alternative meaning of the preceding word, the use of the word
"or" in the indictment is good. Thus, an indictment may validly
charge that the defendant "did forge a certain cheque or bill of
exchange;"3 or "did sell spirituous or intoxicating liquors."'
In some instances a fine line is drawn between words which
are synonymous or explanatory and those which constitute distinct
offenses or methods of committing an offense. In State v. Sullivan5
the pertinent statute imposed a sentence upon anyone attempting
to prevent any witness from appearing and testifying "by force, or
threat, or intimidation of any kind, or by persuasion." The
indictment charged that the defendant by threats or intimidation
attempted to prevent a witness from appearing and testifying.
Quashing the indictment, the court stated that while it was true
that a threat could be regarded as a form of intimidation, it was
not the only form; and that the defendant had a right to know
whether he was charged with the offense of preventing a witness
from testifying by threats or with preventing the witness from
testifying by intimidation in some other form.
The overwhelming weight of authority supports the holding
in the present case.' An analogous situation had been presented in
connection with charging the operation of a "blind tiger" under a
statute which disjunctively enumerated the methods of committing
the offense. An affidavit charging that the defendant "did unlaw-
fully operate a blind tiger . .. , keeping intoxicating liquors for
8. State v. Maas, 37 La. Ann. 292 (1885).
4. State v. George, 134 La. 177, 63 So. 866 (1913).
5. 125 La. 560, 51 So. 588 (1910); immediately affirmed by State v. Hood,
125 La. 568, 51 So. 589 (1910).
6. State v. Fant, 2 La. Ann. 837 (1847);. State v. Bogan, 2 La. Ann. 838
(1847); State v. Banton, 4 La. Ann. 31 (1849); State v. Markham, 15 La. Ann.
498 (1860); State v. Palmer, 32 La. Ann. 565 (1880); State v. Foster, 32 La.
Ann. 84 (1880); State v. Flint, 33 La. Ann. 1288 (1881); State v. Richards, 33
La. Ann. 1294 (1881); State v. Samuels, 38 La. Ann. 457 (1886); State v.
Romus, 48 La. Ann. 581, 19 So. 669 (1896); State v. Edmunds, 49 La. Ann. 271,
21 So. 266 (1897); State v. Behan, 118 La. 754, 87 So. 714 (i904); State v.




sale, barter, exchange, or habitual giving away" was pronounced
defective on the ground that the defendant was entitled to be in-
formed whether he was to be prosecuted for keeping intoxicating
liquors for sale or barter or exchange or the habitual giving away
of such liquors!
In such cases, as in the principal case, the indictment or affidavit
must charge in which manner the offense was committed. When
the offense has been committed in more than one way-when more
than one of the disjunctively-enumerated statutory conditions were
met-these offenses or methods of committing the offense should
be stated conjunctively. However, in such cases, it is not necessary
that both be proved.8
An interesting collateral problem arises when the indictment
uses the expression "and/or." Generally the courts have disap-
proved of the use of this device,9 and labeled it on one occasion"0 a
"certainty-destroying expression." The use of such language is
highly dangerous, but in some instances the situation has been
saved by the fact that the phrases thus joined were virtually synony-
mous, and no uncertainty as to the charge resulted."
In earlier cases where uncertainty or duplicity were found, the
indictment was quashed. 2 Following the modern trend away from
technicality, the court, in the present decision, took the better view
in remanding the case to allow amendment under Article 252 of
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.
J. B. OLINDE
7. State v. Nejin, 140 La. 37, 72 So. 801 (1916). See also State v. Barnette,
138 La. 693, 70 So. 614 (1916),
8. State v. Bryan, 175 La. 422, 143 So. 362 (1932); State v. Burns, 131
La. 396, 59 So. 823 (1912); State v. Selsor, i40 La. 468, 73 So. 270 (1916).
See also State v. St. Philip, 169 La. 468, 125 So. 451 (1929), where the
information in one count charged that the defendant and two others "did . . .
set fire to and burn, and cause to be burned, and did . . . , willfully . . . aid,
counsel, and procure the burning of a dwelling house .... ." The two alleged
confederates were acquitted. Held, when the two others were acquitted, all that
the defendant could be guilty of was burning the dwelling house.
9. Compton v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. Rep. 648, 91 S. W. (2d) 732 (1936);
State v. Herndon, 339 Mo. 283, 96 S. W. (2d) 376, 118 A. L. R. 1375 (1936).
10. State v. Beacon Publishing Co., 141 Kan. 734, 42 P. (2d) 960 (1935).
11. In re Owen, 207 N. C. 445, 177 S. E. 403 (1934), involved an application
filed before a proceeding of a state board of dental examiners for the revocation
of the license of a dentist, alleging the dentist solicited business by "running
paid advertisements and/or solicitation for professional business" in a newspaper.
12. See note 5, supra.
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